A Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Judicial Prior Restraint and the First Amendment by Mincberg, Elliot
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 5
1-1993
A Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions:
Judicial Prior Restraint and the First Amendment
Elliot Mincberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elliot Mincberg, A Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Judicial Prior Restraint and the First Amendment, 44 Hastings L.J. 871
(1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol44/iss4/5
A Look at Recent Supreme Court




When we look at First Amendment decisions over the last several
years, First Amendment advocates are struck by a paradox. On the one
hand, in some cases the Supreme Court, including its most conservative
members, appears to be a vigorous defender of the First Amendment and
strikes down even Congressional statutes that interfere with First
Amendment freedoms. For example, in both Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
New York State Crime Victims Board (the Son-of-Sam case),1 and R.A. V
v. City of St. Paul,2 the Supreme Court was unanimous, producing eight-
een votes in favor of the First Amendment. Similarly, in United States v.
Eichman,3 the flag-burning decision, Justice Scalia joined the majority in
ruling that the law prohibiting flag-burning was unconstitutional.
The Court majority in other cases, however, led by conservative
Reagan-Bush appointees such as Justice Scalia, has deferred to govern-
ment regulation and rendered decisions seriously harmful to the First
Amendment. For example, consider Rust v. Sullivan,4 the abortion gag-
rule case; Employment Division v. Smith,5 which severely damaged the
right to free exercise of religion; and the public forum cases, including
United States v. Kokinda6 and International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc. v. Lee.
7
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1. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
3. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
4. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
5. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
7. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
How can we understand this? We can find at least a partial explana-
tion in two opposing impulses, even among the most conservative Jus-
tices, as exemplified by Justice Scalia. First, there is a libertarian impulse
among people like Justice Scalia to be against what they may regard as
"heavy-handed government regulation" of attitudes and beliefs, and
against the so-called "political correctness" movement. According to
this view, when one is within the genuine First Amendment sphere one
must be vigorous in defending free expression rights and the rights of the
individual. On the other hand, there is the kind of "statist" view, exem-
plified particularly by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that defers to the govern-
ment against individual rights.
Now, if you are Justice Antonin Scalia, or any of the other Justices
on the Court, how do you reconcile these contrary impulses? One way is
by effectively imposing a kind of prior restraint on First Amendment
analysis. In other words, if before reaching the question of whether a
restriction is valid under one of the demanding First Amendment tests,
such as strict scrutiny, the Court decides a priori that the First Amend-
ment does not apply, or that the version of the First Amendment that
does apply is very weak, then the conflict is resolved because the Court
does not have to get into the First Amendment and strict scrutiny at all.
In other words, it is an attempt to restrain First Amendment analysis, in
many cases, before the Court even gets there-to define things out of the
realm of the First Amendment, or at least the most demanding aspects of
the First Amendment. To put it another way, we often say that applica-
tion of the First Amendment "triggers" strict scrutiny. This method of
analysis effectively puts a trigger lock on the First Amendment.
We can see at least three particular examples of this type of analysis
in Supreme Court decisions over the last several years: First, the use of
the "neutral laws of general applicability" rationale; second, permitting
government self-definition of the "public forum"; and third, virtually
redefining out of existence First Amendment burdens on government
benefits.
The starting point in terms of neutral laws of general applicability
has to be Employment Division v. Smith. Before Smith, since at least
Sherbert v. Verner,8 the courts had ruled consistently that where a law
burdens the free exercise of religion-that is, the exercise of religion by
individuals in terms of their own religious practices-even if that law is
neutral or not intended to restrict religion, that law is unconstitutional
unless it survives strict scrutiny-unless it is necessary to promote a com-
8. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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pelling governmental interest. The classic example is Wisconsin v.
Yoder,9 where compulsory school attendance laws, as applied to the
Amish, were ruled unconstitutional.
Smith, however, drastically and dramatically changed that. Even
those who agree with Smith would have to agree that Justice Scalia's
opinion in that case effected a major change in First Amendment analy-
sis. In that case, which concerned an Oregon law criminalizing peyote as
it applied to American Indians who used peyote for sacramental pur-
poses, Justice Scalia essentially applied a prior restraint on the First
Amendment by saying that no significant First Amendment scrutiny
needed to be applied at all to the law, because it was a neutral law of
general applicability that was not intended to infringe First Amendment
free exercise rights.
The most eloquent attack on Justice Scalia came from Justice
O'Connor, who effectively demonstrated how dramatically Justice
Scalia's opinion had changed the law. As Justice O'Connor explained in
her concurring opinion in Smith, "laws neutral toward religion can co-
erce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his reli-
gious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion." 10 According to
Justice O'Connor, "the First Amendment was enacted precisely to pro-
tect the rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by the
majority and may be viewed with hostility."1" Quoting from Justice
Jackson's opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,12 Justice O'Connor noted that "'[tihe very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy,'" including the right to free exercise of religion. These
rights" 'may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.' "13 But, according to Justice Scalia, and unfortunately the
majority, it simply is not so.
Another way of demonstrating how widespread the criticism against
the Smith opinion has been is to note who has been attacking it. Critics
include everyone from People for the American Way and the American
Civil Liberties Union on one side, to the National Association of
Evangelicals and the Traditional Values Coalition on the other. These
and many other groups have joined in supporting the proposed Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which would create a federal right to free ex-
9. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
10. 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 902.
12. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
13. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638).
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ercise of religion equivalent to the constitutional right before Smith.
Nevertheless, constitutional liberty has been severely damaged by the de-
cision in Smith.
The use of "neutral laws of general applicability" analysis, however,
has not stopped with the Free Exercise Clause. The Court also used this
analysis recently in the free press area in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.14
There, in an opinion by Justice White, the Court said that a confidential
source could sue a newspaper and reporters under a promissory estoppel
theory for using that confidential source's name contrary to a promise
made by reporters. The Court in Cowles did not, for example, seek even
to balance First Amendment rights against promissory estoppel. In-
stead, the Court explained that what was at issue was simply a neutral
law-promissory estoppel-and that therefore the First Amendment just
did not apply.
Justice Souter was eloquent in his dissent in Cowles, talking about
the importance of applying First Amendment principles in much the
same way Justice O'Connor did in her concurrence in Smith. And as he
and others have noted, one of the problems with Cowles, at least in the-
ory, is that it threatens decisions like Hustler Magazine v. Falwell15 or
even New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' 6 After all, libel laws and laws
against intentional infliction of emotional distress are neutral laws that
are not aimed particularly at the press. One could argue that there
should not be a special First Amendment protection for the press in
those areas, based on neutral law of general applicability analysis. Fortu-
nately, the majority does not appear prepared to go that far.
The direction this analysis really could take is illustrated most dra-
matically by Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,17 the case in which the
Supreme Court ruled five to four that an Indiana law banning public
nudity can be properly applied to ban nude dancing. All of the justices
except Justice Scalia analyzed that statute under the O'Brien test, which
essentially suggests that a neutral law of general applicability--one that
is not specifically aimed at, but actually has an effect on, expression-has
to pass an intermediate but nonetheless rigorous First Amendment test,
rather than undergo strict scrutiny.18
Justice Scalia had a markedly different view: "Since the Indiana
regulation is a general law not specifically targeted at expressive conduct,
14. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
15. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
16. 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
17. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
18. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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its application to such conduct does not in my view implicate the First
Amendment." 19 According to Justice Scalia, only if conduct is prohib-
ited because of its communicative attributes does the First Amendment
come into play. If this is not the case, then even with respect to a law
that burdens free expression, judges should apply the judicial prior re-
straint and not even get to First Amendment analysis. In other words,
Justice Scalia wants to do what the conservative majority has done in
civil rights areas-to import an intent test, in a sense, to the First
Amendment. Unless a legislature or city council intends to affect free
speech rights, according to Justice Scalia's theory, the First Amendment
does not apply at all. This is an extremely dangerous view that ignores
the special status of religion, speech, and the press under the First
Amendment, as Justice Jackson said so many years ago.20
There is a second area in which we are seeing attempts, not always
successful, to apply judicial prior restraint to First Amendment analysis:
permitting government self-definition of the "public forum." Without of-
fering a comprehensive view of what public forum law was even before
the Supreme Court modified it further in the last couple of years, the
Court suggested that there were so-called "traditional" public fora like
sidewalks and parks, and so-called "designated" public fora, in which
restrictions on speech could only survive if they could meet strict scru-
tiny. With respect to everything else that was public property, a restric-
tion on speech would be legitimate unless it was an unreasonable
restriction or unless it was one that was viewpoint-based.
In the last few years, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly
placed everything in the third category, effectively letting the government
self-define even what were thought to be traditional public fora. The best
example of this is United States v. Kokinda,21 in which Justice O'Connor
wrote the plurality opinion. Kokinda concerned a post office regulation
prohibiting solicitation on a public sidewalk between the post office and
the parking lot. The plurality said that even though it is a sidewalk,
which is after all one of the very fora to which the Court in Hague v.
19. 111 S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring).
20. In fact, Justice Scalia attempted to apply this type of analysis to free speech issues
again last term in his opinion for the majority in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992). Relying in part on his concurring opinion in Barnes, Justice Scalia wrote in dicta that
when "the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are
not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philoso-
phy." Id. at 2545-46.
21. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
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CIO 22 was referring in defining public fora, they would not consider it
either a "traditional" or a "designated" public forum.
The sidewalk was not a traditional public forum, according to the
plurality, because it was built for nonspeech purposes and because it is in
a specific location between the post office and the parking lot. As the
dissent pointed out, however, most parks are built for recreational rather
than First Amendment purposes, but nonetheless are considered tradi-
tional public fora. Similarly, the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court
is not built for expressive purposes and was built in a specific location to
get people to and from the Supreme Court building, but the Court itself
in United States v. Grace23 said that the sidewalk was protected as a
"traditional" public forum under the First Amendment. The plurality
opinion in Kokinda contradicts this analysis.
Perhaps even more troubling was the plurality's rationale on the
"designated" forum issue. The sidewalk was not a "designated" public
forum, according to the plurality, because even though the post office
allowed other First Amendment activities such as leafletting and picket-
ing, it did not allow soliciting. Therefore, as far as soliciting was con-
cerned, the sidewalk was not a "designated" public forum. According to
that rationale, anything the government so desires can be defined out of
and removed from being a public forum, relegating speech restrictions to
the lowest level of public scrutiny.
A similar view was upheld by the majority in the International Soci-
etyfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON),24 having to do with
municipal airports. What is interesting and somewhat hopeful for the
First Amendment in ISKCON is that even though Justice O'Connor, for
example, added airports to the category of the nonpublic forum, she was
willing to add some teeth to the First Amendment test in this area. Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, even though a public airport is not a public
forum, the rule against leafletting and other kinds of speech could not be
considered reasonable and therefore was unconstitutional.
But again, we need only look to Justice Scalia to see the troubling
direction in which this analysis could be heading. This is illustrated by
another case from this past term, Burson v. Freeman.25 Burson con-
cerned the constitutionality of laws that ban political campaign activity
within a certain radius of a polling place on election day. Eight members
of the Court agreed that this restriction had to be evaluated by using
22. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
23. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
24. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
25. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
[Vol. 44HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
JUDICIAL PRIOR RESTRAINT
strict scrutiny, because it was clearly a content-based restriction on a
traditional public forum-sidewalks outside of a polling place. Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, however, even if the sidewalk was not built for the
specific purpose of taking people to and from the polling place, because
there had been so many states that for so long had restricted speech in
those areas, they had effectively taken that part of the sidewalk out of the
public forum, at least on election day. In other words, Justice Scalia
would effectively permit total self-definition of a public forum. All the
state must do is have enough attempted regulation for a long enough
time, and according to Justice Scalia there is literally nothing left of even
the most traditional public forum for First Amendment purposes. The
result is to put a prior restraint on First Amendment analysis-not to
exclude it totally in this instance, but to relegate it to the lowest level of
First Amendment scrutiny.
A final example of this type of First Amendment analysis has to do
with redefining out of existence government First Amendment burdens
on benefits, as illustrated by the Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan.26
While there is some controversy about just what the law was before Rust,
in general the courts had ruled that while there was no right to a govern-
ment job or other government benefit, it was improper to condition a
government job or benefit on giving up First Amendment rights while on
the job. For example, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,27 while
employees were certainly free to advocate pro-union or anti-union senti-
ments outside the job, that was not enough for the Supreme Court. It
violated the First Amendment, according to the Supreme Court, to re-
quire public employees to join a union and essentially symbolically sup-
port the union on the job as a condition of having that job in the first
place.
In Rust, however, the Court dramatically departed from that analy-
sis. Rust concerned Title X family planning clinics. As a condition on
receiving government money to help run those clinics, under a Reagan
era regulation, the clinics were not allowed to counsel with respect to
abortion, not allowed to refer people to abortion clinics, and indeed were
required to say that they did not consider abortion appropriate and to do
other kinds of very clearly anti-abortion directed counseling. The rule
involved in Rust should have raised unconstitutional conditions and re-
lated concerns; indeed, as a viewpoint based-rule, it clearly should have
been subjected to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.
26. 111 S. Ct. 2538 (1991).
27. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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Instead, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the majority im-
posed a prior restraint on First Amendment analysis. The First Amend-
ment did not apply at all to the Rust restriction, according to the
majority, because it was not an unconstitutional condition that was being
applied-doctors could speak outside of the clinics, and all that was hap-
pening was that there was a narrow definition of the Title X program.
The program at issue was defined, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist,
as pre-conception family planning and other kinds of activities that do
not relate to abortion, and therefore all the government was doing was
refusing to subsidize pro-abortion activities while subsidizing other types.
The dissent in Rust made clear the real problems with that analysis.
Indeed, in the Title X program itself it was perfectly legitimate to refer
pregnant women to medical services that would lead away from abortion.
Doctors could refer women to pre-natal services, or to gynecological
services, but could not refer them to abortion-related services, indicating
the improper viewpoint-based nature of the Rust rule. Even the majority
saw that its analysis might be going a little bit too far in all cases; the
majority noted, for example, that in the context of universities, its new
version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would be somewhat
problematic. But again, the majority attempted to place a prior restraint
on First Amendment analysis.
After Rust, under the Bush Justice Department, there were serious
and troubling attempts to extend the Rust doctrine further. In Board of
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Sullivan,28 and in
Finley v. NEA, 29 the government sought to extend that analysis to apply
to funding of scientific research and to funding of the arts. Fortunately,
the lower courts in both of those cases rejected the extension of the Rust
analysis. It is difficult to predict the future of Rust, and many believe
that it may be confined to the specific context of abortion counseling. In
any case, Rust provides yet another example of judicial prior restraint on
the First Amendment.
The future of this type of analysis is somewhat unclear. In part, it
will depend upon the composition of the Supreme Court. In part, it will
also depend on the other Justices' reactions to the dialogue and the coun-
terpoint that is developing between Justice Scalia, who is clearly a cham-
pion of prior restraints on First Amendment analysis, and Justices Souter
and O'Connor, who on several occasions have disagreed with such
analysis.
28. 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1991).
29. 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992), appeal pending.
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In any event, this subject is an important one to keep in focus be-
cause of the dangers presented by "prior restraint" analysis. First, such
analysis has several times amounted to a kind of sneak attack on the First
Amendment. Placing entire controversies outside the realm of the First
Amendment makes it easier in some ways for judges to handle what can
be difficult First Amendment issues. In a case like Employment Division
v. Smith, moreover, the issue was never even raised by any of the parties
in the case, it was totally unnecessary to the outcome (as Justice
O'Connor observed), it occurred in a case that seemed unsympathetic to
some First Amendment advocates on its facts (since it dealt with drugs)
and, until the Court rendered its opinion, it had not looked like a case
that threatened to redefine the First Amendment. That suggests a real
need for advocates to keep a careful eye on cases that come to the
Supreme Court because they may lead in dangerous directions that are
not initially apparent.
Furthermore, attempted judicial prior restraint on First Amend-
ment analysis is particularly dangerous because of the fact that it can
narrow so dramatically the scope of the First Amendment. This is true
even with respect to content- and viewpoint-based restrictions, such as in
Rust and Barnes. It may leave us with what is a vigorous First Amend-
ment, in a sense, but a vigorous First Amendment within a sphere that
can become so narrow as to eviscerate the kinds of protection that the
First Amendment was designed to provide.
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